…
Europe has an interest in maintaining trade with China, cooperating on climate, and engaging on numerous other issues. But that should not be an excuse to avoid the core question: how does Europe defend its strategic interests against a power that increasingly uses trade, technology, and interdependence for political purposes?
…
Europe must not simply follow Washington – and certainly not Trump. US China policy is tougher, more erratic, and often primarily aimed at maintaining American pre-eminence. Europe has other, distinct interests. We do not want a world divided into blocs, where every choice is turned into a test of loyalty. And we must be wary of a potential US-Chinese ‘deal’ that comes at the expense of our interests.
…
Charting its own course does not mean that Europe must be soft. On the contrary. Europe must be less naive about market access, take stricter action against Chinese state subsidies, and work faster on reducing dependencies on critical raw materials and technology. Europe must also be more honest about the costs involved. That is where the problem lies. You hear everywhere that Europe must act geopolitically. But as soon as that geopolitics costs money and touches upon national preferences, the conversation falls back into familiar patterns, including in the Netherlands. Then we want strategic autonomy, but no joint financing. Less dependence on China, yes, but without industrial policy or trade tensions.
That is not how it works. Those who want to be less vulnerable must invest. Those who want to act strategically must set priorities and accept risks.
…
Europe is not powerless. It has a vast market, strong companies, and technological expertise. The EU has a wide range of instruments to tackle Chinese malpractice. But those assets are under pressure and only count if they are played strategically. And that is precisely what Europe is failing to do.
…