• 1 post
  • 24 comments
Joined 2 years ago
Cake day: October 28th, 2024
  • Instead of caddy -> auth OIDC -> services, can you do auth OIDC -> caddy -> services? That way you can put the auth OIDC in the DMZ VM, while putting caddy in the other VM with all the services? Alternatively maybe caddy (DMZ) -> auth OIDC (DMZ) -> caddy (LAN) -> services (LAN)

    If you can’t, you can always use firewalls on the services VM to prevent services from talking to each other. Preventing them from talking to the internet can be achieved by putting them in an “internal” network (if using docker compose, set “internal: true” when defining the network)

  • I’m not sure I understand. First off I’m not the same person as GP. Second, the admins are proposing an AI tag, which I’m supportive of. I’m just saying that I am OK with AI-assisted projects being posted to this community (with the AI tag of course)

  • Fine, but others including myself want that slop as far away from here as possible

    And there are people like me who are fine with moderate AI use and would rather judge the project themselves rather than have them rejected outright.

    Maybe there should be a community poll

  • Just because it’s on a disc doesn’t mean it can be played offline. The game that started #StopKillingGames was the 2014 game The Crew that was shut down in 2024, and even if you had the physical discs, the game required internet and stopped working after 2024

  • From 12:48 of the video:

    Gamers Nexus: “Were you able to lock in contracts for memory with the suppliers directly or did you have to jump through a bunch of hoops or…”

    Rep from Valve: “Look there’s no contract, there’s nothing. Those guys…they are…they give us a price every month, and they say ‘you can buy that many’, and it’s yes or no, and if we say no then they never talk to us again”.

    Gamers Nexus also links another video they made specifically about the DRAM cartel.

  • If I have a bare metal dedicated server, which has only access to IPs contained in my whitelist on a dedicated opnsense, I have less to wory about.

    Sure, someone could still find a openbsd/opnsense exploit and get me, but my point is: complex systems break in complex ways, the more complex systems you use, the more attack surface u have, need to know and understand to control and mitigate it.

    The way I would frame it is: using complex systems that you are unfamiliar with is risky. In your case, you are familiar with OPNsense and firewalls. So that may be the more secure option for you. But for somebody who isn’t familiar with firewalls, there are a lot of ways to mess up. For example, IP and mac spoofing is very easy. OPNsense and firewalls often don’t have very good defense against IP spoofing, especially if the malware is already inside your LAN (for example, a malicious app running on a smartphone).

    Using proxmox and other virtualization platforms has one big advantage: you can experiment and play around and learn, without much risk. With a physical server, if you mess up and get infected, you may have to throw away the whole server. You can’t just re-install the OS, because the malware could have installed a rootkit or infected the bios or other firmware. But with a VM, if the VM gets infected you can just delete the VM and create a new one. One of the main goals of a hypervisor is to sandbox the VM, so that malware is contained.

  • “best” is of course subjective. Bare metal could be better, but imo the marginally smaller attack surface isn’t worth it. If the Qubes project trusts that a hypervisor is secure enough, then I trust it as well.

    I run 10+ VMs all the time, no way am I going to buy 10 bare metal servers. The ability to create new secure environments on-demand is unbeatable.

    And bare metal does have security disadvantages too. It has a physical attack surface that a VM does not. For example, defending against usb attacks. Of course for a VM, the hypervisor/host can be attacked physically, but you only need to worry about securing that one. Securing 10 physical servers is a lot more work than securing just one, so you’re more likely to get lazy, slip up, etc.

  • Nobody believes virtualization is perfect, it’s just the best we got because:

    • smaller attack surface
    • security is the priority over adding new features (the opposite of most other development cycles)
    • in practice we have seen how secure it is relative to other systems like the kernel

    And anyways, even a separate physical computer can be hacked. If it has networking, there could be a vulnerability in the networking stack. Just making an outbound tcp connection can be enough to be pwned.

    I think the closest thing we have to an “invincible” system is seL4, but I rarely hear about amybody using them

  • copy fail allows VMs to infect the host system? I thought it was a kernel vulnerability, not a hypervisor vulnerability. Containers and LXCs share the kernel with the host, full VMs do not. So a kernel exploit allows container escape but not VM escape.

    Kernel exploits happen a few times a year. Hypervisor exploits and VM escapes are VERY rare.

    Using SSH for clustering is optional. You can just use normal VMs. You don’t have to install SSH into the VM, you can view it through proxmox. The only difference between a VM and a separate physical machine is the hypervisor, so the only security difference is the security of the hypervisor. And as I mentioned, hypervisor exploits are very rare.

    Edit: for a sense of perspective, think about this. Almost every major tech company in the world relies on hypervisors for security. Qubes OS, known in the privacy/security world as one of if not the most secure OSes, relies on the hypervisor for security. An easily exploitable hypervisor escape would be a vulnerability on the scale of the XZ utils backdoor (which was unsuccessful). I have not seen a vulnerability of that scale since heartbleed.

    Edit2: a word